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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)
V- )
)
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC. )
)
Defendant and Petitioner. )
)
--------------------------------- )
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989, Respondent Khalid Khawar brought suit 
against Globe International, Inc. (Globe), Roundtable Publishing 
(Roundtable), and Robert Morrow (Morrow), in Los Angeles Superior 
Court, alleging defamation. See Khawar v. Globe Int'l. Inc.. 54 
Cal.Rptr 2d 92, 98 (1996). Ali Ahmad, Respondent's father, also
filed a defamation suit against the same defendants on November 
29, 1989, in the same court. See id. The trial court 
consolidated Respondent's and Ahmad's actions on September 16, 
1991. id.i. In advance of trial, both Respondent and Ahmad
reached a settlement with Roundtable and Morrow. See id.
A jury trial commenced on March 1, 1994. (C.T. 2687.) The
trial court ordered the jury to return two advisory verdicts 
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 592.
(C.T. 2780, 2790.) On March 10, 1994, the court granted Globe's 
Motion for Nonsuit with respect to Ahmad. (C.T. 2694.) At the 
conclusion of the trial between Respondent and Globe, the jury
1
found for the Respondent, and awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages in the amount of $1,175,000. (C.T. 2783, 2791.) The
trial court nullified the jury's finding that the article was 
neutral and accurate reportage. (C.T. 2752-53.)
Globe filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the April 15,
1994 judgment and the Court of Appeal for the Second District 
granted review. See Khawar, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. The Court 
of Appeal affirmed the judgment against Globe on June 5, 1996.
See id. at 92. This Court granted certiorari to review this
matter on September 25, 1996. §eg
Statement of Facts
On June 4, 1968, United States Senator Robert Kennedy was 
assassinated at a campaign appearance in Los Angeles, California. 
(R.T. 1338.) Respondent was positioned in close proximity to 
Senator Kennedy on a podium at this event. (R.T. 1339.) 
Photographs and motion picture footage recorded Respondent 
standing on the podium near the Senator. (R.T. 1345-47.) The 
photographs and footage received worldwide attention, and one 
photograph appeared on the cover of Time magazine. (R.T. 1391- 
93.) Respondent knew of this publicity, and kept a copy of the 
magazine. (R.T. 1392.) Television broadcasters broadcast some 
of the motion picture footage at least once a year through the
’ At the trial's conclusion the jury found: (1) the article was a 
neutral and accurate report of the statements contained in Mr. 
Morrow's book; (2) Respondent was a private figure; (3) Globe 
published its article negligently and either with knowledge that the 
statements in the article were false or with reckless disregard to 
the veracity of those statements; and (4) Globe published the article 
with malice or oppression. (C.T. 2782-83.)
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time of the trial. (R.T. 1393.) The day following the 
assassination, Respondent tried to sell his own photographs of 
the evening's events to Life magazine. See id. Law enforcement 
officials and the Federal Bureau of Investigation questioned 
Respondent several times following the assassination. (R.T. 
1351.)
In November 1988, Morrow, an author, wrote The Senator Must 
Dig, a book proposing that Senator Kennedy's death was part of a 
conspiracy involving professional crime organizations and SAVAK, 
the Iranian secret police.(C.T. 3145.) In his book, Mr. 
Morrow suggested that the true assassin was not Sirhan Sirhan, 
who was ultimately convicted of the assassination, but instead a 
foreign agent named Ali Ahmand. (R.T. 1096-97.) The book 
contained photographs depicting Respondent on the podium with 
Senator Kennedy, with captions identifying Respondent as Ali 
Ahmand. (R.T. 156.)
In the April 4, 1989 issue of The Globe. John Blac)dDurn, a 
reporter employed by Globe, wrote an article reporting on The 
gen^tpr Must Dig. (R.T. 1089.) To gather background material 
for his article, Mr. Blackburn read Morrow's book and conducted 
an in-depth interview of the author. (R.T. 1093, 1101.) The 
article reported Morrow's allegations, attributing them to him 
more than a dozen times, and quoted from his book in several
Mr. Morrow authored a first book. Betrayal. an account of President 
John F. Kennedy's assassination. (R.T. 841.) Morrow published this 
book in 1974, and the book was the impetus for Congressman Tomas 
Downing's establishment of the House Select Committee on 
Assassinations. (R.T. 842-43.)
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places. (R.T. 1090-93.) With the article, Globe printed two 
photographs, one of them reproduced from the book. (C.T. 3145 
R.T. 2742-43.) This photograph showed Senator Kennedy at the 
podium with Respondent (who was indicated by an added graphic 
pointer) seen in the background. (C.T. 3145.) The article 
identified the person in the photograph as Ali Ahmand. S^e id
4
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether Respondent's affirmative efforts to link himself 
with a public controversy, or events beyond Respondent's 
immediate control drawing him into a public controversy, 
rendered Respondent a limited-purpose public figure.
II. Whether publication of an article about a nationally 
distributed book, combined with unsuccessful efforts to 
locate the subject of the book, constitutes actual malice.
III. Whether California should protect the free press by adopting 
a neutral reportage privilege as applied to Globe 
International's neutral and accurate report on a 
controversial book.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure with respect 
to the June 4, 1968 assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. He 
took various voluntary, affirmative steps before and after the 
assassination to associate himself publicly with the that event. 
These acts included seeking and obtaining a position adjacent to 
the Senator on the evening of the assassination under the glare 
of publicity and intense public scrutiny; attempting to sell his 
own pictures of the event; and in the years following the 
assassination, publicly identifying himself with Senator Kennedy. 
Thus, Respondent is a voluntary limited-purpose public figure.
Even if Respondent's actions do not render him a voluntary 
limited-purpose public figure, photographs and video broadcasts 
continue to portray him in association with Senator Kennedy 
nearly 30 years after the assassination. Several books have 
identified Respondent as a possible assassin of the Senator.
Thus Respondent is at least an involuntary public figure with 
regard to this controversy of continued public interest.
Actual malice in the context of defamation is a demanding 
standard, requiring knowledge of a statement's falsity or a 
reckless disregard for the truth. Respondent has not 
demonstrated that Globe acted with actual malice. Accordingly, 
this Court must reverse the trial court's award of punitive 
damages. Globe placed its faith in reliable sources and efforts 
to contact Respondent. The article it published reported on a 
book by a best-selling author. An earlier book by the same 
author spurred Congress into conducting hearings to investigate
6
his allegations regarding another assassination. Thus, Globe did 
not display the requisite knowledge of, or reckless disregard 
for, falsity in the article it published.
To avoid chilling free speech and debate, and to help 
reporters and editors predict the boundaries of liability, this 
Court should adopt the neutral reportage privilege to cover 
republication of credible sources' allegations regarding 
newsworthy controversies. The privilege would enable courts and 
editors alike to avoid the complex and difficult determination of 
a subject's status as public or private. The circumstances of 
this case illustrate the need for a new standard enabling 
journalists to avoid liability for defamation and libel.
Excessive zeal in protecting individual privacy chills free 
speech and debate on public issues by forcing editors to err on 
the side of caution and self-censorship. By recognizing such a 
limited privilege, this Court would both shield Globe in the 
present case and protect other publishers that, in good faith, 
republish reliable sources' allegations. State and federal 
courts in California and elsewhere have recognized that 
preserving a free press requires shielding accurate reports of 
allegations under a neutral reportage privilege.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE
ISSUES ON APPEAL.
The appropriate standard of review for cases involving libel 
is ds novo review. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union. 466 U.S. 
485, 510-11 (1984); McCoy v. Hearst Corp.. 42 Cal, 3d 835, 842 
(1986). In McCoy. this Court cited Bose for the proposition that
7
independent review is necessary to protect constitutional 
liberties because only clear and convincing evidence may overcome 
First Amendment protections. 42 Cal. 3d at 842.
A trial court's decision regarding a plaintiff's limited 
public figure status for defamation purposes is a mixed question 
of law and fact. Penney v. Lawrence. 22 Cal. App. 4th 927,
933 (1994) . The standard of review of such a trial court 
determination "is whether, after an independent review of the 
entire record, substantial evidence supports the trial court s 
decision." Id.; see also McCov. 42 Cal. 3d 835 at 842.
Whether a jurisdiction has adopted a rule or privilege are 
questions of law, which this Court reviews independently. Sge 
Cocker Nat' 1 Bank v. City and County of San Francisc_o, 49 Cal. 3d 
881, 888 (1989).
Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; 
their resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed 
questions of law and fact concern the application of 
the rule to the facts and the consequent determination 
whether the rule is satisfied. If the pertinent 
question involves the experience with human affairs, 
the question is predominantly factual and its 
determination is reviewed under the substantial 
evidence test. If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a 
critical consideration in a factual context, of legal 
principles and their underlying values, the question is 
predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed 
independently.
Id.
In the present case, this Court is asked to adopt a new rule 
of law. The new elements must be applied in a critical context 
considering the underlying legal principles. gee iiL.
Independent review is therefore proper.
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II. BOTH RESPONDENT'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTS AND EVENTS BEYOND HIS 
IMMEDIATE CONTROL RENDERED HIM A LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC 
FIGURE FOR DEFAMATION PURPOSES.
American courts have long required public officials and 
public figures to prove actual malice to prevail in an action for 
defamation relating to their public status. See New York Times
Cq_;_3L:_Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (regarding public
officials); Curtis Publ'a Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. 
Walker. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the New York Times rule to 
all public figures).
Courts have identified two classes of public figures: all­
purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures. See 
Gertz V. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). An all­
purpose public figure is one of "such pervasive fame or notoriety 
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all 
contexts." Xd. Conversely, a limited-purpose public figure 
"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public 
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited 
range of issues." Id. (emphasis added). While private figures 
generally enjoy broad protections against defamation, courts 
usually afford limited-purpose public figures less protection 
insofar as "the allegedly defamatory communication relates to 
[their] role in a public controversy." Reader's Digest Ass'n v. 
Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 253-54 (1984).
Courts have declined to fashion a bright-line test for when 
an individual achieves limited-purpose public figure status. 
Courts have, however, ruled that an individual does not acquire 
that status merely by being a criminal defendant (see Wolston v.
9
Reader’s Digest: Ass’n. 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979)), or by seeking 
relief through the courts in a matter that has drawn public 
attention. Time. Inc - v- Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457
(1976) .
A, Respondent Pursued a Prominent Position in the Publig
Controversies of Senator Kennedy's Campaign and
Assassination.
1. Respondent's affirmative efforts—gafisfy the
requirement of seeking a prominent—role—in a
public controversy.
In determining whether an individual is a private or a 
limited-purpose public figure, this Court has noted that "courts 
should look for evidence of affirmative actions by which public 
figures' have thrust themselves into the forefront of particular 
public controversies." Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 254-55.
In that case, this Court ruled that the Synanon Church and its 
founder had become public figures through "their myriad attempts 
to thrust their case and Synanon in general into the public eye," 
rather than accepting the plaintiffs' "own statements regarding 
their public visibility and reputation." Id^ at 255.
Respondent's efforts at self-promotion and connection with 
Senator Kennedy's assassination do not rise to the level of 
Synanon's attempts, which included publicity campaigns; 
solicitation of favorable books, newspaper articles, and a motion 
picture; and alleged intimidation of critics. See id. 
Respondent's efforts do, however, constitute "thrust [ing]
[himself] into the forefront of [a] particular public 
controvers[y]," id.. sufficient to render him a limited-purpose 
public figure.
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Respondent so thrust himself by many actions, beginning when 
he actively sought a position on the podium in a hotel ballroom 
next to Senator Kennedy during the Senator's nationally televised 
primary victory speech. {R.T. 1339.) Respondent's own position 
as a freelance photographer for a Pakistani publication 
demonstrated the worldwide attention focused on Senator Kennedy's 
campaign. (R.T. 1389.) Respondent, as a member of the press, 
knew that millions of people worldwide would see anyone on the 
podium via broadcasts and photographs. (R.T. 1391.) In fact, 
Respondent specifically wanted to be seen and photographed next 
to Senator Kennedy. (R.T. 1340.) The affirmative act of 
positioning himself on the stage was his first and most literal 
effort to "thrust [himself] into the forefront" of an entirely 
public affair. (R.T. 1339.)
On the day following the assassination, Respondent continued 
to pursue a public role in this controversy. (R.T. 1393.) He 
sought to sell his photographs of Senator Kennedy's final speech, 
and of the pandemonium following the assassination, to Life 
magazine. (R.T. 1393.) Though unsuccessful in selling these 
photographs, pictures Qf_ Respondent (including one on the cover 
ot Time magazine) entered the national consciousness via 
televised and published reports of Senator Kennedy's last few 
minutes. (R.T. 1392-93.)
Since that time. Respondent has continued to publicly 
associate himself with the Kennedy assassination. (R.T. 1358.)
In his office. Respondent prominently displayed a picture of 
himself on the podium with the Senator, Respondent admitted that
11
hundreds of people viewed this photograph each year. (R.T. 1357- 
59.) This demonstrates that Respondent connected himself in the 
public eye with the Kennedy assassination, especially within his 
community of Bakersfield. By actively encouraging this 
association. Respondent maintained his involvement in a long­
standing public interest in Senator Kennedy's death.
2. Recognizing Respondent's public-ficrure status is
consistent with the policies underlying the
distinction between public and private figures.
Respondent has demonstrated at least a modicum of access to 
the media, addressing the Gertz concern for "greater access to 
the channels of effective communication" enabling the victim to 
mitigate the defamation's impact on reputation. G^rtz, 418 U.S. 
at 344. In Gertz. this factor is apparently a rationale for the 
public-private distinction, rather than an element in 
establishing public-figure status. See Harris v. Tomczak, 94 
F.R.D, 687, 699-700 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
After filing this lawsuit, Respondent broadcast on local 
television a response to Morrow's book, the Globe article, and 
other accusations. (R.T. 1368-70.) This enabled Respondent to 
mitigate the impact any defamation had on his reputation. 
Respondent claims reputational damage, presumably primarily in 
the area where he lived and was widely known, Bakersfield, 
California. (R.T. 1356-59.) He responded in that area through 
local television, a medium that probably reached more viewers 
than did the Globe article.^ The issue containing that article
" Respondent may thus have actually increased the number of people 
aware of the accusations.
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sold only 1,800 copies in Bakersfield. (R.T. 1862.) Thus, 
Respondent was able to substantially counteract the Globe 
article's statements within the area where he was most concerned 
about injury, presumably mitigating his damages. Most important, 
he showed that he satisfied the Gertz court's media-access 
rationale for the public-private distinction.
The United States Supreme Court has given weight to pre­
lawsuit requests by plaintiffs that their alleged defamers print 
a retraction. See, e.Q.. Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 443 U.S. Ill, 
118 n.6 (1979); Time Inc, v. Firestone. 424 U.S, 448, 452 (1976). 
California similarly encourages such mitigation. Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 48 (West 1986). Nothing in the record indicates that 
Respondent ever asked Globe to retract its article, or that he 
asked for room to respond. If he had asked and Globe had 
acceded, the retraction would have reached substantially the same 
audience as saw the initial article.
®• Respondent Became an Involuntary Limited-Purpose Public
Figure After Senator Kennedy's Assassination.
At least one court has held that an individual became an 
involuntary limited-purpose public figure because he played a 
sufficiently central role in a public controversy, and the 
alleged defamation was germane to his involvement. See Dameron 
V. Washington Magazine. Inc.. 779 F.2d 736, 741-43 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) . Dameron, an air traffic controller, sued a publisher over 
a sidebar in an article on airport safety. See id. at 737-38.
The sidebar concerned crashes in which air traffic control 
problems were implicated; it erroneously suggested that the
13
controllers in a crash that occurred on Dameron's watch may have 
been at fault. £££ icL. at 738. After that crash, Dameron 
appeared and testified repeatedly at public hearings into the
crash. *
ipjjg pameron court applied a three-part analysis, finding 
that an airplane crash generating extensive public hearings was a 
sufficient public controversy, that the alleged defamation (which 
did not identify plaintiff by name) related to that controversy, 
and that Dameron himslf played a sufficiently central role in the 
controversy. at 741-43. The latter prong of the test
ordinarily examines voluntary acts of the plaintiff. id^ at
741. The court modified this prong to examine whether the 
plaintiff's "relatively passive involvement in this controversy 
suffices" to render him a public figure. Id. Factors the court 
weighed in determining his status included his repeated 
appearance in public hearings and the past use of his likeness in 
reports on the event. id__ at 742. The court observed that
"[b]y sheer bad luck, Dameron happened to be the controller on 
duty at the time of the . . . crash. He became embroiled, 
through no desire of his own, in the ensuing controversy over the 
causes of the accident." Id.
In the instant case, the "public controversy" prong of the 
Dameron test is clearly satisfied. The assassination of a 
probable presidential candidate, immediately after winning a 
crucial primary, attacks the political process,- it is difficult 
to imagine a more "public" or "controversial" event. Likewise, 
the test's "germane" prong is satisfied: the allegations
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regarding Respondent arose from his presence on the podium next 
to Senator Kennedy immediately before the assassination. Thus, 
as in D^mgrpn. Respondent's public-figure status depends on 
whether he played a sufficiently central role.
Respondent has been publicly associated with Senator 
Kennedy's assassination ever since its occurrence, and thus has 
been drawn into and become a part of the controversy. As in 
p^meron, Respondent's likeness has appeared in depictions of the 
press conference broadcast annually on the anniversary of the 
assassination. (R.T. 1391-93.) Even before the assassination, 
and repeatedly ever since. Respondent's image has entered and re­
entered the public consciousness in connection with Senator 
Kennedy via the famous photographs and video footage from that 
night. (R.T. 1389-90.) Many of these photographs were 
distributed worldwide in print and broadcast media. (R.T. 1391- 
93.) Respondent admitted that he openly displayed one picture 
showing himself with Kennedy the night of the assassination.
(R.T. 1357-59.) Respondent also admitted to being aware of 
annual broadcasts showing him identifiably adjacent to Kennedy on 
the podium. (R.T. 1391-93.) These public displays reinforce the 
linkage Respondent created between himself and the assassination.
As early as 1970, only two years after Senator Kennedy's 
assassination, Robert Blair Kaiser published RFK Must Die, a book 
about the assassination that pointedly described Respondent as 
All Ahmand and questioned his role in events that evening. (R.T. 
2167-69.) Similarly, Morrow's book and others perpetuated the 
vortex of events drawing Respondent deeper into the controversy.
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(R.T. 1605.) Thus, both before and after the assassination, 
events arising from it and beyond Respondent's control have drawn 
Respondent in. Therefore, Respondent had become at least an 
involuntary limited-purpose public figure with regard to the 
assassination of Senator Kennedy.
These broadcasts and publications between the dates of the 
assassination and of Globe's article form a continuous public 
chain of identification linking Respondent to Senator Kennedy and 
his death. However, such a chain is redundant because "once a 
man has become a public figure ... he remains a matter of 
legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days." 
Forsher v. Bualiosi. 26 Cal. 3d 792, 811 (1980). This is so even 
though "[Respondent's] prominence may have diminished in the 
intervening years, and he is no longer a close associate of 
a . . . public figure." Maheu v. CBS. Inc.. 201 Cal. App. 3d 
662, 675 (1988). Respondent therefore was at the time of 
publication, and remains throughout his life, a public figure 
with regard to this controversy.
III. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT RESPONDENT IS A PRIVATE
FIGURE, IT MAY STILL REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES BECAUSE GLOBE DID NOT DISPLAY ACTUAL 
MALICE.
Private plaintiffs alleging defamation must prove either 
"knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth" by the 
defendant in order to qualify for punitive damages. See Ge^fz,
418 U.S. at 349. Such actual malice is not readily and 
universally definable, and courts analyze each case individually. 
See St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968); Harte~Hanks 
Communications v. Connauahton. 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) . Malice
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in this context is a subjective standard, in which the state of 
mind of the defendant is at issue. See St. Amant. 390 U.S. at 
730-31.
In California, a finding of actual malice requires "that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth of 
his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless 
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." 
Antonovich v. Superior Court. 234 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 1048 (1991).
A. Respondent Cannot Satisfy this Court's Test for Finding 
Actual Malice.
This Court has set forth the factors relevant in determining 
circumstantially whether a defamation defendant acted with actual 
malice. S^e Reader's Digest Ass'n. 37 Cal. 3d at 257-58. These 
factors are evidence of (1) negligence, (2) motive and intent,
(3) anger and hostility toward the plaintiff, and (4) reliance on 
sources known to be either unreliable or biased against the 
plaintiff, gee id. These factors may be used "by cumulation and 
by appropriate inferences" to establish recklessness regarding, 
or knowledge of, falsity. Id. at 257. Therefore, no one factor, 
even if plainly present, conclusively demonstrates the requisite 
mental state for a finding of actual malice.
Respondent alleges that Globe was negligent and that it used 
an unreliable source. However, the other factors - motive, 
intent, anger and hostility toward the plaintiff, and reliance on 
sources known to be biased against the plaintiff - are 
uncontestedly absent. Thus, Respondent must prove recklessness 
or knowledge of falsity by 'cumulating' negligence with the use 
of an unreliable source.
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-pjjg Digest court .then indicated what kinds of
characteristics make a source unreliable, referring to Cyrtis
Co V- Butts. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (uncorroborated reliance 
on a source on criminal probation claiming to have overheard a 
telephone call) and Pgp v. Newgwggk, Ing^, 553 P. Supp. 1000 
(S D N.y. 1983) (reliance on a reputed liar, swindler, and 
compulsive gambler). Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 259 n.lO. 
This analysis demonstrates skepticism toward reliance on sources 
of plainly doubtful veracity.
In the instant case, no serious aspersions upon Morrow were 
known to Globe. No facts in the record suggest that he was on 
criminal probation, or had a known reputation as a liar, 
swindler, or gambler. To the contrary, the seriousness with 
which Congress regarded his allegations in the earlier book 
Rptraval suggests that, especially regarding assassination 
theories. Morrow was a prominent and reliable source.
B. Failure to Investigate Is Not Reckless.. Conduct. and
Globe Performed a Reasonable Investigation in These
Circumstances.
Mere failure to investigate does not, by itself, support a 
finding of actual malice. S££ Antonovich. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 
1048. "[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a 
reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would have 
investigated before publishing." IsL. This Court has likewise 
stated that "tt]he failure to conduct a thorough and objective 
investigation, standing alone, does not prove malice, nor even 
necessarily raise a triable issue of fact on that controversy." 
Reader's Digest Ass'n. 37 Cal. 3d at 258.
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New Yprk TiiT\gg Court held that no actual malice existed 
despite a publisher's failure to attempt to check statements in 
its editorial advertisement against either its own internal 
records or external sources, which would have shown several 
allegations to be inaccurate. 376 U.S. at 261. In that case, 
the manager responsible for such investigations perceived no 
evident falsehoods in the advertisement, and relied on the 
endorsement of people whose reputation he "had no reason to 
question." Id, at 260-61. In fact, those so-called endorsers 
had not authorized such a use of their names. See id. at 260.
In the instant case, publisher Globe likewise relied on the 
investigative work of its reporter. Blackburn indicated he 
attempted to confirm the story with Respondent, but was unable to 
locate him. (R.T. 1121-23.) Globe's failure to reach Respondent 
must be viewed in light of the mystery surrounding his true name, 
created by his use of inconsistent names that misled police and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (R.T. 1382-83.) A campaign 
worker compounded the confusion by identifying him as Ali Ahmad. 
(R.T. 1383.) Globe thus made greater efforts to confirm its 
article's truth and accuracy than did the publisher in New York 
Times. Therefore, Globe's publication should be accorded no less 
protection than that afforded the New York Times publisher.
In addition. Globe could reasonably have relied on the 
research Morrow conducted in the course of preparing his book. 
Morrow was already the best-selling author of another book 
postulating a conspiracy in the death of President John F. 
Kennedy. (R.T. 841.) This prior book was sufficiently
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convincing to persuade the Senate to initiate renewed hearings 
into that assassination. (R.T. 842-43.) Globe was thus relying 
on substantial, credible authority in publishing its story, and 
its failure to investigate further does not show "reckless 
disregard for the truth," let alone actual knowledge of falsity.
As Globe's reliance on its sources was in fact reasonable 
and its sources were not known to Globe to be unreliable, and as 
failure to investigate in such circumstances is reasonable under 
New York Times. Respondent seeks to maintain punitive damages 
without demonstrating recklessness or actual malice. Therefore, 
this Court should overturn the award of these damages.
C. The Allegations Made in Morrow’s Book Were Themselves 
Newsworthy. Justifying Globe's Decision to Publish .a
Story About Them.
Because Morrow was a prominent and authoritative source with 
significant credentials regarding assassination theories, Globe 
was justified in treating his book, and its claims about 
Respondent, as news. Morrow's prior bestselling book, which 
received public attention and motivated a congressional 
investigation, established him as a prominent figure in the arena 
of investigating assassinations of political figures. (R.T. 841- 
43.)
Globe's freedom to report on newsworthy events, such as 
these allegations about a critical event in modern political 
history, goes to the heart of the First Amendment. Denying Globe 
the right to bring such allegations to its readers' attention 
would infringe on the public's right of access to important ideas 
regarding the events that shape our nation. Imposing actual-
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malice damages in such circumstances is inconsistent with our
expectations regarding the function of a free press.
IV. CALIFORNIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE A NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE 
THAT PRECLUDES FINDING GLOBE LIABLE FOR ITS REPORT OF 
ANOTHER'S ALLEGATIONS.
California courts should actively protect the First 
Amendment guarantee of a free press and recognize the neutral 
reportage privilege. Several other jurisdictions and lower 
California courts have protected the press by adopting a neutral 
reportage privilege. Recognition of this privilege is consistent 
with the recent Supreme Court holdings. The strong interest in 
protecting freedom of the press necessitates applying the 
privilege to all citizens, public and private. Yet if the 
privilege relates solely to either private or public figures, the 
result in the present case is the same: Globe is privileged 
because it accurately conveyed allegations of a prominent source.
Both Historical and Modern Interpretation of the First
Amendment Mandate Broad Protection of the Free Press.
The present question presented to this Court requires 
determining if the press is protected by a neutral reportage 
privilege. A historically high protection of the press provides 
context for this determination. Our nation's founders espoused a 
broad protection for the freedom of the press. New York Times. 
376 U.S. at 269-70. Both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
realized both that democracy required the information that a free 
press provides and that having a free press required accepting 
some mistakes and false reporting. See 8 The Works of Thomas 
Jeffetgpn 464-65 (Ford ed. 1904); 4 Elliot's Debates on the 
Federal Constitution 571 (1876). Jurists also realized that a
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failure to protect the press would likely end this nation's 
experiment with democracy. Judge Learned Hand and Justice 
Brandeis both reasoned that democracy will fail and tyrannies 
rise if the nation abandons its protections of the press. See 
TTirifed P^ar■es v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943); Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
The United States Supreme Court, operating in the context of 
these powerful policy prerogatives, has held that the First 
Amendment protects the press even on occasions when the press 
publishes libelous statements. See New York Times. 736 U.S. at 
254. The New York Times Court determined whether to sanction the 
press for publishing untrue allegations of misconduct of public 
figures. 736 U.S. at 269. In refusing to find a newspaper 
liable for republishing libelous accusations, the Court held that 
certain false speech must be tolerated to prevent chilling free 
press and promoting self-censorship. See id. at 279. In order 
to maintain vigorous discourse on the conduct of officials, the 
Court protected the publication of defamatory statements 
concerning public figures unless the defamed proved actual 
malice. See id. at 280-81. The United States Supreme Court in 
St. Amant later defined the requirements of actual malice. 390 
U.S. 727.
The Supreme Court ratified this protection of the press in 
Gertz. 418 U.S. at 341, reasoning that "[t]he First Amendment 
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect 
speech that matters." The Gertz Court held that actual malice 
must be shown before liability may attach. Id. For private
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individuals, the Court held that "so long as they do not impose 
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. 
at 347. Some courts interpret St. Amant as extending a certain 
standard of protection from libel to private figures. See Dickey 
V. CBS Inc.. 583 F.2d 1221, 1225 (3d Cir. 1978). However, the 
subsequent Gertz decision recognizes states' responsibility to 
determine a standard of liability for private individuals. 418 
U.S. at 347. This Court should now, consistent with the spirit 
of these holdings, protect public discourse by adopting a neutral 
reportage privilege.
B. A Neutral Reportage Privilege Should Be Recognized to
Further the Policy of First Amendment Free Press
Protections.
This Court must determine whether Globe is privileged to 
republish the allegations of a noted author. Other courts have 
faced similar issues in determining how to ensure a free press 
and inform the public. See, e.g.. Barry v. Time. Inc.. 583 F. 
Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (privilege applied, covering 
republished allegations aibout a public figure) . Recognizing the 
crucial nature of a free press to a democracy, other 
jurisdictions extend protection from libel to the press for 
neutral reports on a controversy. See id.
1. Federal and state courts in other jurisdictions
protect freedom of the press by adopting the
neutral reportage privilege.
The Second Circuit first recognized the privilege of neutral 
reportage in Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y. Inc.. 556 F.2d
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113 (2d Cir. 1977), In that case, the court decided that the 
right to a free press protected publication of a prominent 
source's untrue accusations about a public controversy. i^
at 120. NEW YORK TIMES published an article reporting the charges 
issued by an Audubon Society researcher alleging that certain 
scientists were "paid liars." Id- 116-17, In overturning the 
libel judgment against the Times, the Edw^rOg court held that 
"when a responsible, prominent organization . . - makes serious
charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the 
accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless 
of the reporter's private views regarding their validity. 
at 120.
The trend in other jurisdictions is to recognize the 
necessity of the neutral reportage privilege for protecting the 
free press. See Coliniatis v. Dimas, 965 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (privilege precluded libel liability against newspaper that 
reported an airline's allegations of employee corruption); Gist 
V. Macon County Sheriff's Dep't. 671 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. 1996) 
(privilege precluded defamation judgment against newspaper and 
broadcaster who reported charges shown on a "most wanted 
fugitives" flyer); Price v. Viking Pencniin, Inc.. 881 F.2d 1426 
(8th Cir. 1989) (holding report on F.B.I. agents conduct during
shootout at an indian reservation privileged); Herron v._Tribune
Publ'Q Co.. 736 P.2d 249 (Wash. 1987) (privilege prevents libel 
liability against newspaper that reports information in recall 
petition). These courts have also held that the privilege is 
consistent with the United States Supreme Court holdings and
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mandated by the policy of protection of the press found in 
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.a.. Edwards. 556 F.2d at 120; 
Barry. 584 F. Supp. at 1123.
The trend toward adoption of the privilege has not been 
unanimous, however. The Third Circuit, relying principally on 
its own interpretation of St. Amant. rejected adoption of the 
neutral reportage privilege. See Dickey. 583 F.2d at 1225. In 
rejecting the privilege, the Third Circuit misconstrued the St. 
Amant decision. St. Amant merely defines actual malice as a 
reckless disregard for the truth. See St. Amant. 390 U.S. at 
727. This case plainly does not require that every finding of 
actual malice result in a libel judgment. If this interpretation 
by the Third Circuit were accurate, the First Amendment 
protection of the press would be transformed into a doctrine that 
compels states to find libel every time actual malice is found. 
This interpretation is contrary to the very purpose of the Bill 
of Rights, to limit the government actions by establishing basic 
rights. This interpretation also is contrary to subsequent 
United States Supreme Court decisions. See. e.Q.. Gertz. 418 
U.S. 323. The Supreme Court specifically held that states define 
the standards for determining libel liability in relation to 
private figures. See id. at 347. Given this later ruling, the 
Dickey rejection of the neutral reportage privilege bears little 
weight.
The Third Circuit rejected the neutral reportage doctrine 
without discussing its merits. See, e.o.. Dickey. 583 F.2d 1221 
at 1225. While such a narrow focus on United States Supreme
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Court rulings might be appropriate for federal courts, this Court 
is informed by a broader perspective. The privilege should be 
considered in light of the California Constitution, statutes, 
court decisions, and policy reasoning. The state's interest in 
informing the public about newsworthy allegations in light of 
these considerations favors adoption of the privilege.
2. California law and cases support adoption of a
Neutral Reportage Privilege.
The California Constitution strikes a balance between 
freedom of the press and protection of an individual's 
reputation. "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish 
his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty 
of speech or press." Cal. Const, art. I, § 2(a) (West 1996).
California statutes provide a balance between a free press 
and protection of individuals' reputations. See Brown v. Kelly 
Broad. Co.. 48 Cal. 3d. 711, 726-27 (1989). Laws written in the 
late 1800's sought to mitigate the harsh per se liability rule 
for republishers. See id. California Civil Code Section 47 
enumerates privileged publications that act as a bar to 
liability. See id.; Cal. Civ. Code § 47 (West Supp. 1997). At 
the same time, the California legislature sought to protect 
individuals and, with Civil Code Section 48(a), gave publishers 
an incentive to correct any published defamation. See id.
California courts have interpreted Civil Code Section 47 
fairly narrowly. In Brown, this Court ruled that Section 47 does 
not protect the press from private individuals bringing libel
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actions. 48 Cal. 3d. at 726-27. This Court determined that this 
statue, written a century ago, has a narrow reading. See id.
This Court also noted that protection of publications that 
make false statements about private individuals is inconsistent 
with Gertz. See id. at 740. However, Gertz empowered the states 
to set standards for protecting purely private individuals 
against libel. 418 U.S. at 347. This Court should now revisit 
the issue and determine to what extent California will privilege 
public debate.
Courts in California, both Federal and State, have adopted 
the neutral reportage privilege as consistent with protection of 
the press. See, e.a., Barry. 584 F. Supp. at 1124; Weingarten v. 
Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 149 (1980). The United States 
District Court for the Central District of California, in Ward v. 
News Group Int’1. Ltd.. 733 F. Supp. 83, 84 (C.D. Cal. 1990), 
adopted the neutral reportage privilege without comment. The 
Barry court adopted the privilege after substantial analysis.
584 F. Supp. at 1124. After reviewing Gertz and other cases from 
the United States Supreme Court, the Barry court held that the 
neutral reportage privilege is entirely consistent with the New 
York Times mandate of encouraging free press and an informed 
public. Id. at 1126.
California state court decisions have also found the 
reasoning in Edwards persuasive. In Weingarten. the court quoted 
extensively from Edwards and held that the interest of promoting 
an informed public necessitates that the press be able to freely 
report on charges others have made without assuming liability for
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the accusations. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 149. In Grillo v.—S!Ili£Ji» ^ 
California court again held that the press should not be 
responsible for neutrally republishing the accusations of third 
parties. 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 872 (1983). This Court, in 
recognizing a neutral reportage privilege, advances the policies 
embodied in California's Constitution, statutes, and court 
holdings. California should, as other jurisdictions have, 
maintain a vigorous protection of freedom of the press by 
adopting this privilege.
3. The neutral reportage privilege protects Globe's 
neutral and accurate report of the allegations of
another.
Once adopted, the neutral reportage privilege precludes 
liability if (1) the allegation is made in relation to a public 
figure; (2) the public figure is involved in a public 
controversy; (3) the defamation relates to the controversy; and 
(4) the republication is neutral and accurate. See Crane v. 
Arizona Republic. 729 F. Supp. 698 (C.D. Cal. 1989) .
As demonstrated in Section II, infra, Respondent is a public 
figure. His own voluntary acts are sufficient to place him 
within the legal standards developed for a public figure 
classification. Alternatively, the intense media attention given 
to this controversy has enveloped the Respondent, making him a 
involuntary public figure in relation the Senator Kennedy's 
assassination. Under either of these theories, Respondent is a 
public figure and the first element of the privilege is 
satisfied.
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The second and third elements require that a public 
controversy exist and that the allegations relate to this 
controversy. See Crane, 729 F. Supp. at 710. Plainly, an 
assassination of a political candidate is a public controversy. 
Such a controversy relates to democracy, a central facet of 
public life. An allegation that Respondent was the assassin goes 
to the heart of this controversy. The Second Circuit held that 
the controversy surrounding the effects on wildlife was a 
sufficient controversy to satisfy these elements of the 
privilege. Edwards. 556 F.2d at 113. The present
controversy is much more central to public life, and plainly 
satisfies these elements.
The final element of the privilege requires a neutral and 
accurate report. Crane. 729 F.Supp. at 710. The Globe
reported the allegations printed in a book after interviewing the 
book's author. (R.T. 1101.) The report repeatedly cited the 
book and attributed the allegations in the book to the author. 
(R.T. 1596.) Every effort to attribute the allegations was made, 
and no embellishments to the facts were added. (R.T. 1596.) The 
report printed in The Globe was neutral and accurate, satisfying 
the final element of the test,
A finding that the report is privileged would be consistent 
with the spirit of protection of the free press that informs this 
privilege. If the privilege is adopted, it protects Globe's 
neutral and accurate report of the allegations of Morrow's book.
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C. The Privilege of Neutral Reportage Should Apply to Both
Public and Private Figures,
Courts' efforts to classify individuals as private or public 
figures demonstrate that such determinations are complex and 
difficult. However, editors are expected to make this 
distinction at a moment's notice. An incorrect judgment can 
result in extensive liability. Rather than assume this risk, 
many publishers will self-censor any accusations that are 
possibly objectionable. Ultimately, the public will suffer from 
tepid and timid reporting. This Court should avert this problem 
by adopting the neutral reportage privilege, and apply this 
privilege to protect the republication of allegations made by 
credible sources regarding newsworthy controversies. Doing so 
would privilege Globe's publication of a neutral and accurate 
account of allegations made by a prominent source about a 
controversy of great public interest.
An Ohio court found the public-private distinction 
untenable, holding that the neutral reportage privilege applies 
to allegations against both private and public figures. $eg 
April V. Reflector-Herald. Inc.. 546 N,E.2d 456, 469 (Ohio App. 
1988) . In recognizing this privilege, the court reasoned that 
informing the public about contentious controversies requires 
empowering the press to report accusations made by credible 
sources without fear of liability. See id. The Barry court 
reasoned that the policy imperatives for adopting the neutral 
reportage privilege compel adopting the privilege in relation to 
both public and private figures. See Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1127 
(case related to a public figure so the public/private
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distinction issue was never reached). California state courts 
have reached similar conclusions. See Weinoarten. 102 Cal, App. 
3d at 148. The Weinoarten Court indicated that the logic 
underlying the public/private distinction is tenuous at best.
In distinguishing between public and private figures, courts 
have required minimal acts for a finding of public figure status. 
For example, in Edwards, the persons slandered, although judged 
to be public figures, were not public officials and took no 
actions to become controversial. 556 F.2d at 113. The only act 
conferring public figure status was the publication of research 
articles on the effects of a pesticide. See id. Likewise, 
federal courts in California found a figure to be public merely 
because he once coached a college basketball team. See Dickey 
584 F. Supp. at 1112,
The distinction between public and private figures is 
difficult to make in practice. As seen in Section II, infra. the 
courts have fashioned complex, abstract standards to make this 
distinction. Editors must apply these standards to avoid the 
risk of sizeable losses in defamation lawsuits. Unlike the 
courts, editors must make their decisions under the pressure of 
publication deadlines. A wrong decision could put a small 
publisher out of business. This forces editors to make 
arbitrary, artificial and hasty distinctions. In practice, 
editors will usually decide what to print in light of their 
ability to withstand defamation actions. Large national papers 
with lawyers on retainer and deep resources will face few
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constraints on their choice of stories. In contrast, smaller, 
local California papers will be forced to practice self­
censorship. Applying the neutral reportage privilege to both 
public and private figures would prevent this situation.
Under this universal neutral reportage privilege, Globe 
cannot be found liable for republication of the allegations 
concerning Respondent. The elements of the universal neutral 
reportage doctrine are (1) "an allegedly defamatory accusation 
must be made by a responsible, prominent" source; (2) "the 
accusation must concern a matter of public interest"; and (3) the 
report of the accusation must be accurate and disinterested, i.e. 
the reporter believes the report of the accusation is an accurate 
report of the allegations. April. 546 N.E.2d at 470. The facts 
of this case plainly fit within these elements.
As shown in Section III, infra. Morrow, the author of the 
book from which the charges were taken, is a responsible and 
prominent source. The April court did not elucidate the 
standards for determining when a source is prominent, instead 
finding that a Sheriff in asserting criminal activity was a 
prominent source. 546 N.E.2d at 466. Mr. Morrow is a prominent 
author whose first book proposed an international conspiracy for 
the death of President John F. Kennedy, (R.T. 842-43.) The 
allegations of this first book provided the impetus for a 
Congressional investigation into President Kennedy's 
assassination. See id. Mr. Morrow is at least as prominent a 
source as the source in April. Globe was justified in the
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judgment that the public had a right to know the accusations that 
were made by Mr. Morrow,
Senator Kennedy's murder was and continues to be a matter of 
public interest. {R.T. 1601.) In California, the newsworthiness 
of an accusation is determined by considering the societal value 
of the facts disclosed, the extent disclosure intrudes into 
private affairs, and the extent to which a figure entered the 
public arena, £££ Maheu. 201 Cal. App. 3d at 675. The Maheu 
court held that an alleged affair between millionaire Howard 
Hughes and his personal assistant precluded the assistant from 
bringing a defamation action. Id. at 675. This was found 
despite the fact that the assistant never met Hughes and that the 
allegations were made more than a decade after the assistant's 
employment ended. See id.
The public is keenly interested in the allegations in the 
Globe article. (R.T. 1601.) The public interest in the Kennedy 
family remains intense, and stories relating to the Kennedy 
family continue to be published. Evan Thomas, The JFK-
MgJ'ilyn Hoax, TIME, Oct. 6, 1997, at 36. A theory explaining the 
assassination of a presidential candidate pertains to the 
political process. Information on such topics lies at the heart 
of democracy, defining the integrity of the political process. 
Globe was thus justified in ensuring that the public knew about 
the controversy.
Globe took every effort to provide a neutral and accurate 
report of the contents of Mr. Morrow's book. (R.T. 1594.) The 
article took all reasonable steps to attribute the accusations to
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the book, referring to the author as the source of the 
allegations against Respondent more than a dozen times. (R.T. 
1596.) Globe has satisfied every element of the privilege and 
thus can not be held liable.
D. Policy Imperatives Support Adopting a Neutral Reportage 
Privilege.
In considering where to draw the line in finding liability, 
courts give significant consideration to the effects of impeding 
a free press. In the first judicial acceptance of the neutral 
reportage privilege, the Edwards court began with the proposition 
that "[i]n a society that takes seriously the principle that 
government rests upon the consent of the governed, freedom of the 
press must be the most cherished tenet." 556 F.2d at 115. The 
court reasoned that to have a truly free press mandated 
empowering the press to inform the public about serious charges 
that had been leveled by a credible source. See id. The court 
further reasoned that "what is newsworthy about such accusations 
is that they were made" and that even if the reporter doubted the 
veracity of the allegations, the public must be informed that 
these charges had been made to understand the current 
controversy. See id. at 120. Furthermore, the Edwards court 
found that it was unjust to hold a reporter liable for mere 
repetition of possible slander if the reporter did not espouse 
the viewpoint of the slanderer. See id. However, liability 
would attach if the report of the allegations advocated the truth 
of the allegations and thus did not remain neutral. Set id-
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1• Adoption of a neutral reportage privilege is
consistent with protecting individuals' privacy
and reputation.
As seen in the California Constitution and state statutes, 
state law mandates that the state both protect the individual and 
secure freedom of the press. Cal, Const, art. I, § 2 (a) Cal. 
Civ. Code § 48 (West 1986). However, rather than using 
republication liability to effectively silence the press, the 
state should employ other, more effective means for protecting an 
individual's rights to privacy.
California Civil Code Section 48 is one method of ensuring 
protection of an individual's reputation. This section compels a 
party that has been slandered to demand a retraction. Cal. Civ. 
Code § 48 (West 1986). Newspapers are likely to try to avoid 
printing conspicuous retractions by ensuring accurate reporting 
in the first instance. This statute also equalizes the power of 
both the private and public individual by ensuring access to the 
media.
According to the California Constitution, in addition to 
protecting the individual, the state must also strive to maintain 
a free press. in New York Times, the Supreme Court gave 
considerable weight to the charge that fear of defamation 
liability would have a chilling effect on free speech and would 
result in self-censorship of the news. 376 U.S. at 279, The 
need for vigorous public debate mandates adopting the neutral 
reportage privilege.
By adopting this privilege in regard to both private and 
public figures, this Court could avoid the arbitrary and
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artificial distinction between public and private figures. The 
standards set forth in Gertz for determining whether an 
individual is private are based on affirmative acts to enter into 
the public arena. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. This perversely 
extends the greatest privacy protection to those who stonewall 
the media. As demonstrated in Section II, infra, distinguishing 
public from private status is a Gordian knot. To further 
judicial economy, the Court should eliminate this requirement.
2. The policy of protecting press sources also 
supports adoption of the privilege.
The press' need to rely on credible printed sources for news 
supplies another compelling justification for adopting the 
neutral reportage privilege. The vast majority of publications 
do not have the resources to independently investigate every 
newsworthy story, and must rely upon other printed news sources. 
In Lavne v. Tribune Co.. 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933), the court 
refused to hold a newspaper liable for printing an allegedly 
defamatory story gathered from a wire service. Id. at 238. The 
court found that republication of a false statement taken from a 
generally recognized reliable source of news could not constitute 
libel, absent some finding that the publisher was negligent or 
reckless. See id. at 186, In recognizing this privilege, the 
court acknowledged that if newspapers were not allowed to print 
others' published news, many local papers that could not afford 
national corespondents would be forced to print only aseptic 
"fluff news." See id. at 188.
The privilege for republication from news sources applies 
broadly to private persons and non-wire service printed news
36
sources. The Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to hold a 
newspaper liable for the republication of a report republishing a 
charge against a private person of multiple murders that was sent 
out on a wire service. See Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette. 
478 N.E.2d 721, 727 (Mass. 1985). The court found that holding 
the paper responsible for verification of the details of this 
story would effectively end the paper's ability to print any news 
except local stories. i^ at 725-26. A federal district
court likewise held that NEWSWEEK magazine was not liable for 
republishing libelous statements gathered from "reliable 
periodicals, newspapers, and wire service reports." Nelson v. 
Associated Press. 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
The freedom of the press is seminal to a functioning 
democracy. However, this freedom will be chilled if Globe is 
held liable for republishing the allegations of a noted author. 
The press will be forced to censor accurate reports of newsworthy 
accusations. This censorship will occur even if the allegations 
have independent informative value. Additionally, the press 
would not be able to rely upon the research of others found in 
printed news sources, and would be forced to repeat the research 
of other authors. Editors, at risk for libel liability, would be 
forced to restrict the flow of information to the public. A much 
better policy would be to have libel liability rest upon the 
source of the defamation. This provides a recourse to defamed 
individuals while still allowing the press to inform the public 
about noted controversies. This policy best serves California.
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CONCLUSION
This court should overturn the finding of the Court of 
Appeal and hold that Globe is not liable for accurately 
republishing the charges of another. Mr. Khawar took on the role 
of a journalist in a contentious election and thrust himself into 
a world of intense media attention, becoming a public figure.
This Court should now remain consistent with the standards for 
determining public figure status set in this and other 
jurisdictions, and hold that Respondent's actions make him a 
limited-purpose public figure. Because Respondent is a public 
figure, Globe cannot be found liable for defamation.
Even if Respondent is found not to be a public figure, he 
still must prove actual malice for Globe to be held liable for 
punitive damages. However, the jury's findings and persuasive 
legal authority indicates that Respondent has failed to meet the 
burden of proving actual malice.
Finally, this Court should adopt the privilege of neutral 
reportage as applied to Globe in the present case. Recognizing 
this privilege would protect the free press and is consistent 
with United States Supreme Court and state court holdings.
Dated: November 19, 1997 Respectfully submitted.
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